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Impairments in the social use of language, or pragmatics, constitute a core characteristic of autism. Problems with pragmatic language have also been documented in fragile X
syndrome (FXS), a monogenic condition that is the most common known genetic cause
of autism. Evidence suggests that social cognitive ability, or theory of mind, may also be
impaired in both conditions, and in autism, may importantly relate to pragmatic language
ability. Given the substantial overlap observed in autism and FXS, this study aimed to better define those social-communicative phenotypes that overlap in these two conditions
by comparing pragmatic language ability and theory of mind in children with idiopathic
autism and children with FXS, with and without autism, as well as children with Down
syndrome and typically developing controls. We further examined correlations between
these cognitive-behavioral phenotypes and molecular genetic variation related to the Fragile X Mental Retardation-1 gene (FMR1) in the FXS group. Results indicated that children
with idiopathic autism and those with FXS and autism performed comparably on directassessment measures of pragmatic language and theory of mind, whereas those with
FXS only did not differ from controls. Theory of mind was related to pragmatic language
ability in all groups. Pragmatic language and theory of mind also correlated with genetic
variation at the FMR1 locus (Cytosine-Guanine-Guanine repeats and percent methylation).
These results point toward substantial overlap in the social and language phenotypes in
autism and FXS and suggest a molecular genetic basis to these phenotypic profiles.
Keywords: autism, fragile X syndrome, pragmatic language, social communication, theory of mind

Autism and fragile X syndrome (FXS) are genetically based neurodevelopmental disorders that share a number of cognitive and
behavioral characteristics, including impairments in social communication, or pragmatic language. Pragmatic language is a complex skill grounded deeply in the capacity to apprehend and contend with social information. Mastering pragmatic language skills
(e.g., politeness strategies, adopting different registers, or styles of
communication depending upon addressee, conversational, and
narrative practices, etc.) hinges on the ability to anticipate others’ interests, infer the background knowledge brought by each
interlocutor to the communicative interaction, monitor participants’ involvement, and appreciate cultural conventions for social
and communicative interaction (Grice, 1975; Brown and Levinson, 1987; Sperber and Wilson, 2002; Wilson and Sperber, 2004).
Such abilities may be considered aspects of social cognition or
“theory of mind,” namely, the ability to attribute thoughts, emotions, beliefs, and desires to others, and to appreciate that others
may hold thoughts and feelings that are different than one’s own.
Important evidence for the role of theory of mind in pragmatic
language ability has come from studies of autism, where autistic
groups’ theory of mind difficulties appear strongly associated with
the pragmatic language impairments observed in this population
(Loveland and Tunali, 1993; Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan, 1995;
Surian et al., 1996; Capps et al., 1998, 2000; Tager-Flusberg, 2000;
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Losh and Capps, 2003). Ultimately, such findings from neurogenetic populations may provide clues to the brain and gene basis of
complex human traits such as social communication and theory
of mind, by providing links between gene, brain, and behavior. In
other words, characterizing pragmatic language impairments in
autism and related neurogenetic disorders such as FXS could help
to clarify how underlying genetic variation and resultant changes
in brain development might give rise to specific phenotypes such
as pragmatic language or theory of mind impairment.
Whereas the genetic basis of autism is complex, with the disorder still defined behaviorally (American Psychiatric Association,
1994), FXS is a monogenic X-linked disorder that is the most common inherited cause of intellectual disability (ID) and the most
common known genetic cause of autism. Because FXS is more
etiologically homogeneous than idiopathic autism, careful study
of autism-related phenotypes in the context of this single-gene
disorder can provide an important avenue for identifying pathophysiological mechanisms underlying the symptoms of autism,
and informing the genetic basis of complex human skills such as
pragmatic language and theory of mind.
In this study, we compared pragmatic language ability in children with idiopathic autism and children with FXS, with and without autism, in order to better define those social-communicative
phenotypes that overlap in these two conditions. We further
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examined theory of mind in these groups, both to characterize
groups’ abilities and to determine whether there exists phenotypic
overlap in this important domain, as well as to examine theory of
mind as a potential underpinning factor in the pragmatic language
impairments in each group. As noted, strong links have been documented between pragmatic language impairment and theory of
mind in autism, but to our knowledge, these relationships have not
yet been studied in FXS. Finally, we examined molecular genetic
correlates of pragmatic language and theory of mind in the FXS
group, with the goal of detecting gene-behavior associations that
may have implications for the genetic basis of social communication and theory of mind. Below we present a brief review of FXS
and rationale for comparison of pragmatic language and theory
of mind in autism and FXS.

INTRODUCTION TO FXS AND ITS OVERLAP WITH AUTISM
Fragile X syndrome is the most frequent known hereditary cause of
ID (Dykens et al., 2000; Hagerman and Hagerman, 2002), with the
full mutation estimated to occur in approximately 1 in 2,500 to 1 in
5,000 individuals (Hagerman, 2008; Coffee et al., 2009; FernandezCarvajal et al., 2009). On the X chromosome, an expansion of
Cytosine-Guanine-Guanine (CGG) repeats in the Fragile X Mental Retardation-1 gene (FMR1) results in methylation (i.e., shutting
down) of the gene and reduced or absent production of the Fragile X Mental Retardation Protein (FMRP). FMRP is thought to be
critical for typical brain development (Devys et al., 1993; Jin and
Warren, 2003), and its deficiency in FXS is believed to underlie
the physical and cognitive-behavioral characteristics of the syndrome. Males with FXS typically experience moderate or severe
ID (Bennetto and Pennington, 2002; Abbeduto and Chapman,
2005) and more severe impairments than females overall, because
females possess one unaffected X chromosome in addition to one
affected chromosome (Hagerman and Hagerman, 2002; Loesch
et al., 2003; Reiss and Dant, 2003; Bailey et al., 2008, 2009). Commonly co-occurring conditions include social anxiety (Bregman
et al., 1988; Hagerman, 2002; Cordeiro et al., 2011), attentional
deficits (Hooper et al., 2000; Wilding et al., 2002), and autism
(Hagerman and Hagerman, 2002).
Autistic characteristics observed in individuals with FXS
include stereotypic and repetitive behaviors, poor eye contact, and
social avoidance (Reiss and Freund, 1992; Hagerman and Hagerman, 2002). FXS is the most common known single-gene disorder
linked to autism (Hagerman and Hagerman, 2002). Results of
studies using gold standard diagnostic measures indicate that 20–
50% of males with FXS may also have autism and as many as
three-quarters may meet ASD criteria (Rogers et al., 2001; Kaufmann et al., 2004; Philofsky et al., 2004; Clifford et al., 2007; Hall
et al., 2008). In addition, approximately 2–6% of individuals with
autism test positive for the fragile X mutation (Hagerman, 2006).
Language development is impaired in males with FXS beyond
expectations for cognitive level, with greater deficits in language
production compared with comprehension (Roberts et al., 2001,
2008; Abbeduto et al., 2007; Finestack et al., 2009). Early investigations of pragmatic language in FXS reported poor topic
maintenance with inappropriate responses, rambling, automatic
phrases, and perseveration or repetitive language (Hanson et al.,
1986; Madison et al., 1986). However, these studies included small
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samples and lacked comparison groups. Compared with controls
with typical development or Down syndrome (DS), males with
FXS have greater difficulty maintaining topics of conversation and
produce more off-topic or tangential contributions to the topic
(Wolf-Schein et al., 1987; Sudhalter and Belser, 2001) as well as
more perseveration (Wolf-Schein et al., 1987; Sudhalter et al., 1990;
Roberts et al., 2007a). Young individuals with FXS may also be
less likely than MA-matched typically developing (TD) children
to report actions during story retelling (Estigarribia et al., 2011)
and to request clarification or additional information in the face
of unclear messages from a communication partner (Abbeduto
et al., 2008). Compared with individuals with idiopathic autism,
males with FXS without autism produced more turns per topic
and less echolalia but more perseveration in one study (Sudhalter
et al., 1990).
Autism status of participants with FXS was handled differently across the studies reviewed above – individuals with FXS
and comorbid autism were either excluded (Sudhalter et al., 1990;
Abbeduto et al., 2008), included as a separate group (Roberts et al.,
2007a; Estigarribia et al., 2011), or autism status was not reported
(Hanson et al., 1986; Madison et al., 1986; Wolf-Schein et al., 1987;
Sudhalter and Belser, 2001). Several studies have directly examined the role of autism in language in FXS. On global language
assessments, males with FXS and comorbid autism show more
severe language deficits than males without autism (Bailey et al.,
2001; Rogers et al., 2001; Philofsky et al., 2004). Findings are more
mixed with respect to specific language domains, however. In several studies, groups of males with FXS did not differ by autism
status in either receptive or expressive vocabulary (Price et al.,
2007; Roberts et al., 2007a; Kover and Abbeduto, 2010; McDuffie
et al., 2012) or syntax (Price et al., 2007, 2008; Kover and Abbeduto,
2010; McDuffie et al., 2012). However, individuals with FXS and
comorbid autism performed more poorly than those with only
FXS in receptive vocabulary and syntax in one study (Lewis et al.,
2006), and autism severity may be negatively related to receptive
vocabulary skill when a continuous analytical approach is taken
(McDuffie et al., 2012). In two studies, boys with both FXS and
autism did not differ from those without autism but did differ
from TD controls (whereas boys with only FXS did not) in expressive vocabulary (Roberts et al., 2007b) and overall story retelling
ability (Estigarribia et al., 2011), perhaps suggesting that autism in
FXS negatively impacts these language areas as well. Boys with FXS
and comorbid ASD have been shown to produce more off-topic
or tangential language than boys with only FXS (Roberts et al.,
2007a). Children and adolescents with both FXS and autism were
also rated higher than those without autism in the current use
of stereotyped utterances/delayed echolalia and reciprocal conversation on the Communication domain of the Autism Diagnostic
Interview-Revised (ADI-R; Lord et al., 1994) in another recent
study (McDuffie et al., 2010).

THEORY OF MIND IN FXS
For the most part, theory of mind performance in FXS appears
to be on par with cognitive expectations, and children with FXS
score comparably to children with DS or ID of unknown etiology (Mazzocco et al., 1994; Garner et al., 1999; Cornish et al.,
2005). Children with FXS also perform similarly on false belief
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theory of mind tasks to younger, non-verbal mental age-matched
TD children (Abbeduto et al., 2001). However, some studies have
reported theory of mind deficits in FXS that cannot be explained
by cognitive impairment. In a recent comparison of 30 boys with
FXS to 15 boys with unspecified ID, Grant et al. (2007) found
poorer overall performance on standard false belief tasks among
the FXS group (Grant et al., 2007). Similar findings were reported
by Garner et al. (1999), who found that a small group of eight
boys with FXS performed significantly worse than a matched ID
group on a deceptive box false belief task, although these findings
may have been sporadic as no group differences were detected
on a secondary false belief task (the Sally–Anne task), nor on a
second-order false belief task (Garner et al., 1999).
A few studies have examined the impact of autism comorbidity on theory of mind abilities in FXS syndrome, and suggest that
autism status may play a role in theory of mind ability in FXS.
Lewis et al. (2006) compared non-verbal IQ-matched groups of
children with FXS with and without comorbid autism, and found
that the children with FXS who met criteria for autism showed
worse performance on false belief tasks, despite similar cognitive
ability (Lewis et al., 2006). The study by Grant et al. (2007) failed to
detect differences in false belief performance among children with
FXS with and without autism, although there was a non-significant
trend toward poorer performance in the comorbid autism group
(Grant et al., 2007).

RATIONALE FOR THE PRESENT STUDY
In spite of considerable overlap between autism and FXS, and evidence that both disorders are characterized by difficulties in pragmatic language, and likely theory of mind as well (at least in those
individuals with comorbid FXS and autism), few direct population
comparisons exist to allow precise comparison of these populations and drawing ties between known underlying genetic variation and the social phenotypes of interest. Additionally, whether
impairments in pragmatic language and theory of mind may be
related in both populations is not known. This study addressed
these questions by comparing pragmatic language ability and theory of mind in children with idiopathic autism, children with FXS
with and without autism, children with DS (included as a comparison group to control for general cognitive delays), and TD children.
Further, correlations with genetic variation at the FMR1 locus
were examined to inform the potential genetic underpinnings of
pragmatic language and theory of mind profiles observed.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS

Study participants were 28 boys with idiopathic autism (autism
only; ASD-O), 40 boys with both FXS and ASD (FXS-ASD), 21
boys with FXS only (FXS-O), 21 boys with DS, and 20 TD boys participating in a large-scale longitudinal study of speech, language,
and social-behavioral profiles in children with neurodevelopmental disabilities. Boys with autism, FXS, and DS were recruited from
the Research Participant Registry Core of the Carolina Institute
for Developmental Disabilities (CIDD) at the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC), genetic clinics, and parent support groups in the Southeastern, Eastern, and Midwestern U.S.
TD boys were recruited through the CIDD Participant Registry
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Core, schools, and childcare centers in North Carolina. Study procedures were approved by the institutional review boards at UNC
and Northwestern University.
Participants included only boys since females with FXS are less
severely impaired than males (Hagerman and Hagerman, 2002;
Loesch et al., 2002) and less likely to have autism (Clifford et al.,
2007; Bailey et al., 2008). Upon enrollment, parents reported that
all boys were combining three or more words. For all children, English was the primary language spoken in their homes. A composite
score of Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test-Third Edition (PPVTIII; Dunn and Dunn, 1997) and Expressive Vocabulary Test (EVT;
Williams, 1997) raw scores was used to match groups on receptive and expressive lexical skills to help ensure that any differences
detected in social communication and theory of mind were not
due to differences in structural language ability (see below for
description of vocabulary measures and Table 1 for group means
and standard deviations). Pairwise t -tests indicated no significant
differences between groups (all p between 0.09 and 0.85, with the
comparisons between DS vs. FXS-O and TD as well as between
FXS-ASD vs. TD with p > 0.30). Age equivalent scores from both
measures were included as covariates in all statistical models. All
boys with FXS had a diagnosis of the full mutation. Boys were
excluded for having an average hearing threshold greater than
30 dB HL in the better ear, determined from a hearing screening across 500; 1,000; 2,000; and 4,000 Hz with a MAICO MA
40 audiometer. Boys with DS and TD were screened for autism
with the Social Communication Questionnaire (SCQ; Rutter et al.,
2003) and also subsequently excluded for scoring as “autism” or
“autism spectrum” on the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS; Lord et al., 2001), described below. Table 1 provides
background characteristics of participants in each group.
ASSESSMENTS

Boys were tested in a quiet space in a school, home, or in a laboratory setting. The full assessment lasted approximately 4–6 h,
with several breaks to prevent fatigue. Assessments were videorecorded with a Sony Digital8 video camera (Model DCR-TVR27)
and audio-recorded with a Marantz portable solid-state recorder
(PMD670).
Autism classification

The ADOS (Lord et al., 2001) was used to confirm autism in boys
with ASD-O and to classify boys with FXS according to autism
status. The ADOS consists of developmentally appropriate activities that are structured to provide a child with opportunities to
show diagnostic symptoms of autism, and yields classifications of
“autism,” “spectrum,” and “no autism.” Trained examiners coded
administrations from video, with scoring based on the revised
algorithms (Gotham et al., 2007, 2008). Coders included one
research assistant who was reliable with an independent ADOS
trainer, and one coder who was reliable with the aforementioned
research assistant. Twenty-four boys with ASD-O were identified
by the ADOS as having “autism” and three as having “spectrum.”
One additional boy with ASD-O did not meet criteria for autism
or spectrum on the ADOS, scoring 6 (ASD cutoff is 7). However,
because his scores on the Autism Diagnostic Interview – Revised
(Lord et al., 1994) all exceeded diagnostic cutoffs and medical
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Table 1 | Group characteristics.

Chronological age

Non-verbal mental age1

Expressive vocabulary age2

Receptive vocabulary age3

Mean length of utterance (morphemes)

ASD-O

FXS-ASD

FXS-O

DS

TD

N = 28

N = 40

N = 21

N = 21

N = 20

Mean (SD)

Mean (SD)

Mean (SD)

Mean (SD)

Mean (SD)

(Range)

(Range)

(Range)

(Range)

(Range)

9.21 (2.22)

10.55 (2.42)

9.61 (3.03)

10.86 (2.07)

4.84 (1.34)

(4.16–12.74)

(6.58–15.07)

(6.06–14.98)

(6.81–14.86)

(3.23–8.78)

5.88 (1.32)

5.02 (0.49)

5.44 (0.95)

5.33 (0.83)

5.49 (1.45)

(3.92–10.50)

(3.50–6.00)

(4.42–8.25)

(4.33–8.25)

(3.58–9.17)

5.62 (1.59)

4.99 (0.99)

5.42 (1.56)

5.41 (1.30)

5.87 (2.14)

(3.42–8.92)

(2.67–7.25)

(2.75–9.25)

(3.58–8.58)

(2.92–12.33)

5.76 (1.81)

5.67 (1.39)

6.36 (2.55)

5.18 (1.44)

6.12 (2.01)

(3.08–10.00)

(2.42–8.83)

(3.42–13.83)

(2.42–7.50)

(2.17–11.58)

4.18 (0.94)

3.49 (0.69)

3.98 (0.74)

3.14 (0.75)

4.87 (0.54)

(2.22–5.49)

(2.18–4.88)

(2.27–4.74)

(1.76–4.76)

(4.12–6.05)

1

Leiter-R, age equivalent in years.

2

Expressive Vocabulary Test (EVT), age equivalent in years.

3

Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test – 3rd Edition (PPVT-III), age equivalent in years.

records confirmed a clinical diagnosis by an independent diagnostician, he was not dropped from analyses. Thirty-three boys
with FXS were identified by the ADOS as having “autism,” seven as
having “spectrum,” and 21 as having “no autism.” Those meeting
criteria for either autism or spectrum formed the group of boys
with FXS-ASD.

Context, Non-verbal Communication, Social Relations, and Interests. We also compared the Speech, Syntax, Semantics, and Coherence scales as variables of secondary interest. Scaled scores range
from 1 to 19, with a higher value indicating better communication.
The General Communication Composite (GCC) standard score
was also calculated (ranging from 40 to 160) and based on the
sum of 8 scaled scores (all except Social Relations and Interests).

Pragmatic language

The participants’ pragmatic language skills were assessed with
the Pragmatic Judgment subtest of the Comprehensive Assessment of Spoken Language (CASL; Carrow-Woolfolk, 1999) and
the Children’s Communication Checklist-Second Edition, U.S.
Edition (Bishop, 2006). The Pragmatic Judgment subtest is a
direct-assessment tool for examining general pragmatic language
understanding and use. The examiner reads aloud a script representing a particular part of daily life, and children are either asked
to judge the appropriateness of language used in a particular situation, or they are asked to provide a pragmatically appropriate
response. Test-retest reliability coefficients for the Pragmatic Judgment subtest for the age ranges included in this study exceed 0.80,
suggesting that this subtest is a reliable index of pragmatic language skill. Age equivalents were computed for the current study
except in the case of a raw score of 0, which for analysis was considered missing. Four boys with ASD-O, two boys with DS, and
one boy with FXS-ASD received a raw score of 0.
The CCC-2 was developed to measure social language use
(although it also assesses structural language domains), and
requires parents and/or teachers to rate a variety of communication difficulties or strengths according to how often the behavior
in question is observed in everyday settings. For this study, teacher
ratings were used. The checklist includes 70 items and yields 10
scaled scores. The scales of primary interest for pragmatic language
assessment included the following: Initiation, Scripted Language,
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Theory of mind

Theory of mind was assessed using one of two comparable batteries of tasks. The first version included the following tests: Perspective Taking, Diverse Desires, Diverse Belief, False Belief, Knowledge
Access, and Explicit False Belief (Wellman and Liu, 2004; Slaughter et al., 2007). This version involved more complex, primarily
verbal, presentation of the tasks. Results from initial assessments
indicated that the tasks in the original battery were too difficult
for some lower functioning children, and that the heavy verbal
load impacted performance above and beyond children’s levels
of social cognitive competence. Thus, more basic tasks assessing
intentionality and understanding of desires were added to the battery (detailed below), and administration of the false belief tasks
was also modified such that scenarios were enacted, rather than
read as a story involving abstract characters, to decrease verbal and
cognitive load (Flavell et al., 1983; Lewis and Mitchell, 1994; Repacholi and Gopnik, 1997; Matthews et al., 2003; Slaughter et al.,
2007). It was not necessary to alter the Perspective Taking Task as
the protocol was already interaction-based. Two, more basic, tasks
were added to tap metarepresentational skills in children who were
not capable of performing the original, more advanced battery –
Simple Desires and Appearance-Reality – which have been used
with children as young as 14 months and 3 years, respectively, and
are described in the Appendix. Each participant received either
the original or the modified battery of tasks, depending on when
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they were tested. All assessments were second-scored by a trained
research assistant. See Appendix for further task description and
scoring procedures.
To produce a single composite theory of mind score for all children (and ensure comparability across the initial and modified
batteries), factor analysis scores were derived. First, the two batteries were tested in separate confirmatory factor analytic (CFA)
models. Both factor models were estimated under weighted least
squares using MPlus (Muthen and Muthen, 2006). The commonality of the Perspective Taking Task across both batteries provided
an anchor that enabled us to ensure score equivalence across forms.
This task was used to set the metric for the latent variable. The
CFA for the older battery was run first. In the model of the newer
battery, we fixed the factor loading and threshold parameters for
the Perspective Taking Task to be equal to those parameters from
the model of the older battery. Thus, estimates of the latent variable, theory of mind, were equivalent across both models. That is,
a given respondent would be expected to receive the same score
regardless of which form of the test he or she was given. Results
indicated very good model fit for the one factor solution in both
models (older form: RMSEA = 0.003, CFI = 1.00; newer form:
RMSEA = 0.000, CFI = 1.00). Finally, we used the factor models
to estimate and export theory of mind scores for each individual.
To aid in interpretability, these scores were then standardized to
have a mean of 10 and a standard deviation of 1.
Non-verbal cognitive ability

Non-verbal cognition was assessed with the Brief IQ composite of
the Leiter-R (Roid and Miller, 1997), which includes Sequential
Order, Figure Ground, Form Completion, and Repeated Patterns
subtests. Age equivalents were calculated based on the published
norms.
Structural language

Receptive vocabulary, expressive vocabulary, and expressive syntax
were measured with the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test-Third
Edition (PPVT-III; Dunn and Dunn, 1997), EVT (Williams, 1997),
and mean length of utterance (MLU; Brown, 1973), respectively.
Age equivalents for the PPVT-III and EVT were calculated according to published norms. MLU in morphemes was calculated from
100 child utterances produced during the ADOS. The language
samples were transcribed using Systematic Analysis of Language
Transcripts (SALT) software conventions (Miller and Chapman,
2008) and using ELAN transcription software (Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics, 2002; Sloetjes and Wittenburg, 2008),
which allowed transcribers to sync visual information from video
recording with separate high-quality audio recordings. All transcribers achieved 80% reliability against two gold standard transcripts for each diagnostic group prior to transcribing samples for
the present study. A random subset of the transcripts (10% or
more from each group) was independently transcribed by a second research assistant, and morpheme-to-morpheme agreement
between the original and reliability transcripts was 77% overall.
Molecular profile characterization in FXS

Measures of FMR1-related variation were derived from blood
samples and included the number of CGG expansion repeats,
percentage of gene methylation, and percentage of lymphocytes
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producing FMRP. The number of CGG expansion repeats was
determined using PCR analysis to determine repeat size and
Southern blot to confirm PCR results for expanded alleles. Phosphorimaging was performed to determine percent methylation.
Blood smears were analyzed by immunocytochemistry to determine FMRP expression. The majority of blood samples (85%)
were analyzed by Kimball Genetics, Inc., with remaining analyses
completed by one of several other laboratories.
DATA ANALYSIS

Group Comparisons

Between group differences in pragmatic language (indexed by the
Pragmatic Judgment subtest of the CASL and select scales of the
CCC-2) were examined using analysis of covariance (ANCOVA)
models, with the following covariates: age equivalent scores for
receptive and expressive vocabulary measured by the PPVT-III and
EVT, respectively; MLU; and general cognitive ability measured by
the Leiter-R. Planned post hoc contrasts were used to test for specific between group differences. Group differences in theory of
mind were also examined with diagnosis as the primary predictor
and PPVT-III, EVT, MLU, and Leiter-R included as covariates.
Given the large number of models, omnibus F -tests were
adjusted using the Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) procedure to
control for false discovery.
Genetic correlates of pragmatic language and theory of mind in FXS
groups

Simple correlations were run with the FXS group as a whole (to
increase power), between the genetic variables and measures of
structural language (PPVT-III, EVT, MLU, and structural language
subscales of the CCC), general cognition (Leiter-R), pragmatic language (CASL and pragmatic language subscales of the CCC-2), and
theory of mind. Because the number of CGG expansion repeats
and percent methylation were highly skewed, these variables were
log-transformed prior to analyses.

RESULTS
GROUP COMPARISONS OF PRAGMATIC LANGUAGE

Comparisons of group performance on the Pragmatic Judgment subscale of the CASL, controlling for structural language
and general cognitive abilities, were statistically significant, F (4,
108) = 5.49, p < 0.001. Post hoc tests (see Figure 1) indicated
that the ASD-O group scored lower than the FXS-O (d 1 = 0.64),
DS (d = 0.41), and TD (d = 0.69) groups (ps < 0.05). The FXSASD group showed a similar pattern, with significantly lower
scores than both FXS-O (p = 0.021, d = 0.35) and TD groups
(p = 0.029, d = 0.41), but did not differ significantly from the DS
group (p = 0.403). The ASD-O and FXS-ASD groups performed
comparably (p = 0.100).
Model tests and adjusted means are presented in Table 2 for the
subscales of the CCC-2. The models for the Social Relations and
Interests subscales were not significant, and post hoc comparisons
are therefore not presented for these subscales. Significant group
differences were detected for all other subscales.
1 Cohen’s

d (Cohen, 1988) is a measure of effect size where 0.2 is considered small,
0.5 is considered medium, and 0.8 is considered large.
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*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.

Groups not sharing superscripts within a column are significantly different from each other (p < 0.05).

96.63 (4.08)b
9.28
9.07
9.13
9.63
9.56
10.15 (0.97)
7.86
9.90

(3, 62) = 1.16 (3, 63) = 2.97 (3, 63) = 8.80** (3, 64) = 6.45** (3, 63) = 6.74** (3, 64) = 4.77** (3, 60) = 8.15** (3, 57) = 8.58**

9.48

7.31 (0.77)

72.65 (3.81)a

TD

F for Diagnosis (3, 63) = 6.36** (3, 63) = 4.73* (3, 64) = 4.16**

(0.80)b
(0.73)b

4.60
5.73
3.80

(0.81)b
(0.97)c
(0.70)b

3.06
5.71
7.52 (0.85)
6.70
DS

(0.83)c

6.10

(0.79)b

6.87

(0.85)b

6.98 (0.68)

69.64 (3.29)a
4.66

(0.69)a
(0.64)a
(0.72)a

5.50
4.94
5.77
5.23
8.01 (0.72)

(0.85)b
(0.76)a

4.55

(0.70)a,b

6.21

(0.74)a

4.90
FXS-O

(0.63)a,b

5.50
FXS-ASD

4.45

(0.61)a

4.91

6.76 (0.59)

(0.64)a

(0.62)a

67.94 (2.85)a
3.98
5.16

(0.55)a
(0.64)a
(0.74)a

4.33
4.28
4.80
6.90 (0.66)

73.56 (3.95)a

(0.68)a

(0.54)a
(0.56)b
(0.58)a

4.76 (0.72)a
7.46 (0.76)a,c
5.43 (0.78)a

6.31 (0.54)

(0.54)a

(0.55)a

4.49 (0.77)a
6.78 (0.65)a

(0.49)a
(0.55)a

5.09 (0.75)a
5.97 (0.89)a

(0.65)a,b
(0.47)a

5.09 (0.65)a
6.22 (0.89)

Mean (SE)
Mean (SE)
Mean (SE)
Mean (SE)
Mean (SE)

5.46 (0.71)

Mean (SE)
Mean (SE)
Mean (SE)
Mean (SE)
Mean (SE)

Speech
Context
Interests
Social
Non-verbal

communication relations

Initiation
language

ASD-O

Correlations were conducted to examine potential associations
between molecular genetic variables (CGG repeat number, FMRP,

Mean (SE)

CCC-2
Coherence
Semantics

MOLECULAR GENETIC CORRELATES OF PRAGMATIC LANGUAGE IN FXS

Scripted

Comparing scores on the battery of theory of mind tasks, which
were standardized to have a mean of 10 and a standard deviation of
1, covarying language and cognitive ability indicated that the TD
group performed better than ASD-O, FXS-ASD, and DS groups
(all d > 0.70). The difference between TD and FXS-O approached
significance (p = 0.082, d = 0.56). There were no other significant
group differences (see Figure 2).
Significant correlations between theory of mind and performance on the CASL Pragmatic Judgment subscale were found for
all groups (see Table 3). Theory of mind was additionally related
to the “Initiation” subscale of the CCC-2 in the autism group
(r = 0.56, p < 0.05) and in the FXS group, it was related to the
CCC-2’s “Coherence” subscale (r = 0.36, p < 0.01).

Group

THEORY OF MIND AND PRAGMATIC LANGUAGE

Table 2 | Model adjusted scores on pragmatic language and general language subscales of the CCC-2.

The TD group scored significantly higher on the CCC-2 total
score than all other groups (all d > 1.4) with no other between
group differences. This pattern was repeated for the Syntax,
Semantics, Coherence, Scripted Language, and Context subscales
(all d for the comparison with TD > 1.3). On the Speech subscale, the DS group also had significantly lower scores than both
the ASD-O (d = 0.34) and FXS-O (d = 0.76) groups, but was not
different from children with FXS-ASD. TD children had higher
speech scores than all other groups (all d for the comparison with
TD > 1.3). The FXS-ASD group scored lower than both the DS
(d = 0.65) and ASD-O (d = 0.71) groups on the Initiation subscale, with TD boys scoring higher than all groups but ASD-O
(all d for the significant comparisons with TD > 0.70). The pattern of means was most notably different for the Non-verbal
Communication subscale. This was the only outcome, other than
Social Relations and Interests, where the DS sample did not score
significantly lower than the TD sample. The TD group scored significantly higher in non-verbal communication than the ASD-O,
FXS-ASD, and FXS-O groups.

Syntax

FIGURE 1 | Model Adjusted Pragmatic Judgment Scores on the CASL.
Notes: groups not sharing superscripts are significantly different from each
other (p < 0.05). F for Diagnosis (4, 107) = 4.39, p < 0.001.

Score
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Table 4 | Genetic correlations with language (structural and pragmatic
language), general cognition, and theory of mind in the FXS group.
CGG Repeats Log-transformed Log-transformed
FMRP

percent
methylation

PPVT
n
EVT
n
Leiter
n
MLU
FIGURE 2 | Model Adjusted Theory of Mind Scores. Notes: groups not
sharing superscripts are significantly different from each other (p < 0.05). F
for Diagnosis (4, 106) = 2.87, p < 0.05.

n
CASL Pragmatic

−0.33*
36
−0.11
36
−0.36*
36
−0.35*
36
−0.40*

0.33
33
0.31
33
0.34
33
0.10
32
0.33

−0.32
33
−0.41*
33
−0.30
33
−0.34
32
−0.36*

judgment
(n)
Table 3 | Correlations between theory of mind and pragmatic

Theory of mind

language on the CASL.

n
Theory of mind

−0.32
35

33
0.24
33

33
−0.45*
32

*p < 0.05.

ASD-O

FXS (all)

DS

TD

CASL pragmatic judgment

0.56*

0.36**

0.51*

0.54**

age equivalent (n)

21

57

21

19

*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.

and percent methylation) and measures of structural language
(PPVT-III, EVT, MLU, and relevant subscales of the CCC-2),
general cognition (Leiter-R), pragmatic language (Pragmatic Judgment on the CASL, and the pragmatic language subscales of the
CCC-2), and theory of mind. Because CGG repeat numbers and
methylation values were very skewed, these variables were logtransformed prior to analysis. Table 4 presents these results, with
the exception of the CCC-2, where no significant correlations
were detected. No significant associations were observed with
FMRP, but higher CGG repeat numbers and increased methylation were associated with lower CASL pragmatic judgment scores.
Increased methylation was also significantly related to poorer
theory of mind. Measures of structural language and general cognition also showed some relationship with CGG repeat length and
methylation.

DISCUSSION
By comparing the pragmatic language abilities of children with
idiopathic autism or FXS (both with and without autism), with
children with DS and TD children, this study aimed to determine
the extent to which pragmatic language impairment may overlap
in autism and FXS, and may potentially be tied to underlying molecular genetic variation related to FMR1, the gene that causes FXS.
Additionally, we explored theory of mind ability as a potential
correlate of pragmatic language across groups. Prior studies have
reported a link between impaired theory of mind and pragmatic
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language use in autism, but to our knowledge this question has
not yet been addressed in FXS.
Results indicated that the ASD-O and FXS-ASD groups looked
quite similar on direct-assessment of pragmatic language using
the CASL, with both groups performing more poorly than the
FXS-O, DS, and TD groups. Yet on teacher report findings were
more divergent (e.g., Initiation, where the FXS-ASD group scored
significantly lower than the ASD-O group). It could be the case
that a global measure of pragmatic language ability such as the
CASL obscures actual differences between these groups. Alternatively, informant-based methods such as the CCC-2 may introduce
measurement error that complicates group comparisons (e.g., different teachers may have different thresholds for ratings, based on
their prior experience, the composition of their classrooms, etc.).
Further research comparing these groups using direct-assessment
measures of specific types of pragmatic language ability will be
valuable in addressing this question and determining the extent of
overlap in pragmatic language impairment in autism and FXS.
Analyses of theory of mind ability revealed patterns of performance quite similar to those observed in the CASL test of
pragmatic language – the ASD-O and FXS-ASD groups performed
most poorly, and children with FXS-O did not differ significantly
from controls. In this case, however, the DS group performed more
like the ASD-O and FXS-ASD groups. We also found that theory
of mind ability was associated with pragmatic language on the
CASL for all groups, where better theory of mind scores were associated with more pragmatic language competence. Although we
cannot draw definitive causal conclusions from the present data,
these findings certainly support the hypothesis that the ability to
understand and predict one’s own and others’ thoughts, feelings,
intentions, and desires is a critical skill underpinning competent
pragmatic language use (Sperber and Wilson, 2002; Wilson and
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Sperber, 2004). When theory of mind is impaired, as was the case
for the ASD-O and FXS-ASD groups, children may be ill equipped
to contend with the demands of social discourse, and less apt to
glean information necessary for developing pragmatic language
skills. Such a relationship has been demonstrated across a range of
pragmatic language skills in autism (Loveland and Tunali, 1993;
Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan, 1995; Surian et al., 1996; Capps et al.,
1998, 2000; Tager-Flusberg, 2000), and our findings suggest a similarly important role in the pragmatic language problems observed
in a subgroup of children with FXS who show pragmatic language
impairments as well. That significant associations were detected in
all groups, even those who did not show significant pragmatic language impairment, may demonstrate the important role of theory
of mind in supporting more fluent pragmatic language use as well.
It is of course also possible that theory of mind tasks and pragmatic
language are tapping some additional mediating (or moderating)
abilities.
Patterns observed in the FXS-O and DS groups may also
be informative, particularly with regard to defining syndromespecific language and social cognitive profiles across these different groups. In particular, whereas social skills are generally considered to represent a relative strength in individuals
with DS, the literature on pragmatic language in DS is actually quite mixed, with documented challenges compared with
MA-matched TD children including initiation and elaboration
of topics (Tannock, 1988; Roberts et al., 2007a), initiation of
communicative repairs (Abbeduto et al., 2008), and clarity of
messages (Abbeduto et al., 2006). Thus, our finding that boys
with DS performed comparably to boys with FXS-ASD is not
necessarily surprising. On the otherhand, we may have found
significant differences between FXS-ASD and DS groups with
a larger sample size or if we examined particular aspects of
pragmatic language with direct-assessment measures (and it is
important to note that the DS group did not differ significantly from the TD group, whereas the FXS-ASD group did
perform significantly more poorly than the TD group). Thus,
interpretation of these similarities with the present data is not
straightforward.
In the FXS-O group, these data indicated that pragmatic language and theory of mind were relative strengths, and deficits in
these areas may be restricted only to those with FXS-ASD, suggesting that pragmatic language deficit (or theory of mind) is
not a core characteristic of FXS but rather autism in FXS. This
is consistent with findings from Roberts et al. (2007a), who found
that boys with FXS-O did not produce more non-contingent language than TD boys, but that the FXS-ASD group produced more
non-contingent language than both of these groups. However,
it is important to note that the difference between the TD and
FXS-O groups approached significance so may have revealed true
differences with a larger sample.
Though not a primary focus of the current study, findings do have some important clinical implications. Given that
boys with FXS-ASD showed more pragmatic language impairment than boys with FXS-O, performing comparably to boys
with idiopathic autism on a direct-assessment measure, the diagnosis of ASD in boys with FXS should be considered during
assessment and clinicians may consider interventions that have
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been studied in the context of ASD when tailoring intervention approaches for boys with FXS-ASD. Our divergent findings depending on assessment method also support the use
of multiple assessments, including natural language samples, to
fully characterize pragmatic language ability and identify specific targets for intervention which may differ across groups and
individuals.
The group similarities in directly assessed pragmatic language
ability and theory of mind in ASD-O and FXS-ASD may have
important implications for furthering knowledge of the brain and
gene basis of these complex skills. In particular, because much is
known about the molecular and neurobiological basis of FXS, the
considerable overlap observed with ASD-O may help to define specific phenotypes associated with known genetic variation, in this
case variation in the FMR1. We observed correlations with molecular genetic variables that support this association – pragmatic
language on the CASL and theory of mind were both associated with FMR1-related variation in the FXS group. Specifically,
greater methylation was associated with lower theory of mind performance and more impaired pragmatic language ability. Higher
CGG repeat numbers were also related to poorer pragmatic language skills. Genetic variables showed additional associations with
general cognition and structural language, which is perhaps not
surprising given that general cognitive and language functioning
certainly contribute to pragmatic language and theory of mind
abilities. By providing a link between genetic and phenotypic
variation, these findings may offer a foothold for understanding
gene-behavior relationships in atypical and typical development
alike.
This study has some limitations. First, we determined autism
status primarily with the ADOS, but future studies should utilize
information from both the ADOS and ADI-R for all participants
to confirm autism status. Second, we did not examine all potential
underlying mechanisms of social communication, such as anxiety
or various aspects of executive function. Third, we examined social
communication and theory of mind at one time point and in boys
only. Future studies should assess these skills longitudinally and in
both boys and girls.
In sum, this study identified pragmatic language and theory
of mind as important abilities that are impaired in autism, and
in a subgroup of children with FXS who also meet criteria for
autism. This considerable phenotypic overlap between autism
and a known monogenic condition suggests that impairments
in pragmatic language ability and theory of mind may be tied
to a particular genetic variant – the FMR1. Further studies are
needed to clarify those particular types of pragmatic language difficulties common to both conditions, given that results from the
pragmatic language subscales on the informant-based CCC-2 were
not as straightforward as those obtained from direct-assessment
of pragmatic language ability, or theory of mind for that matter. An additional important area for further study concerns the
brain basis of these abilities, and the extent to which impairments may stem from similar neural architectural differences.
By integrating detailed phenotypic analysis with neuroimaging
studies in autism and FXS, future research may provide important insights into the role of FMR1 in social-communicative
phenotypes.
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APPENDIX
Task

Materials/set-up

Script

Control/test questions

Perspective

Clear picture frame with blue fish

“We are going to look at a picture of a fish. What color is

takinga

on one side, white fish on the other.

the fish? Okay let’s switch spots. (Examiner switches

Control: none
Test: “What color fish do I see over

Examiner sits across from

seats with participant, without moving orientation of

here?

participant

frame). Now what color is the fish?”

Diverse

Picture of a broccoli and cookie;

“Here’s Grandma. It’s snack-time. Grandma wants a

desiresb

female adult figurine

snack to eat. Here are two snacks, broccoli and a cookie.

Control: none
Test: “Now it’s time to eat.

Which do you like best? Well that’s a good choice, but

Grandma can only choose one

Grandma really likes [opposite]. She doesn’t like

snack, just one. Which snack will

[participant’s choice]. What she likes best is [opposite]”

Grandma choose?”

Girl figurine, displayed midway

“Here’s Amy. She wants to find her cat. Her cat might be

between a picture of a bush and a

hiding in the bushes or it might be hiding in the garage.

Control: none
Test: “Where will Amy look for her

garage

Where do you think the cat is? Well, that’s a good idea

cat?”

Diverse beliefb

but Amy thinks her cat is in the [opposite]”
False beliefb

Knowledge

Goldfish crackers box with plastic

“Here’s a Goldfish box, what do you think is inside the

Control: “Did Sam look inside this

toy dog inside; boy figurine

Goldfish box? Let’s see. It’s really a dog inside! Okay,
what is in the box?” “Here comes Sam. Sam has never

box?”
Test: “What does Sam think is in

looked inside this Goldfish box”

the box?”

“Here’s a box. What do you think is inside the box? Let’s

Control: “Did Amy look inside this

see. . . It’s really a ball inside! So, what is in the box?

box?”
Test: “Does Amy know what is in

Box with a ball inside; girl figurine

accessb

Here’s Amy. She’s never looked inside this box”

the box?
Explicit false

Picture of a backpack and closet;

“Here’s Sam. Sam really wants to find his game. Sam’s

beliefb

boy figurine

game may be in his backpack. Or it may be in the closet.

Control: “Where is Sam’s game
really?”

Well, really Sam’s game is in his backpack. But Sam

Test: “Where will Sam look for his

thinks his game is in the closet”

game?”

Unexpected

Cardboard M and M’s box filled with

“What do you think is in this box? Lets’ look inside and

Control: “When I first showed you

contents false

buttons. Second examiner, who has

see. What’s in here?”

the box, what did you think was

beliefc,d

left the room

inside it before you opened it?”
Test: “[Second examiner] has never
seen what is in this box. What will
she think is in the box?”

Unexpected

A pen. Second examiner places the

“I know, let’s play a trick on [second examiner]. Let’s hide

Control: “Where is the pen really?”

transfer false

pen on the table and announces “I

her pen. Where do you want to hide it?”

Test: “When [second examiner]

beliefc,d

need to go find my bag in the other

comes back, where will she look for

room- I’ll leave my pen right here

her pen?”

where it is safe”
Simple

Bowl of Goldfish crackers and bowl

“It’s snack-time! Which do you like better? (Examiner

Control: none

desirese

of rice cakes

tastes each food ). Mmm [opposite of child’s preferred

Test: “Can you give me some?”

snack]! Mmm, I tasted the [opposite]! Mmm! Eww

(Examiner holds out hand )

[child’s choice]! Eww, I tasted [child’s choice]. Eww!”
Appearance-

Sponge that looks like a rock;

realityf

Candle that is shaped like a crayon;

“When you look at this, what does it look like?

Test: “What is it really? But what

Control: none

Doll that is covered with a ghost

does it look like?”

cloth; White card covered by
translucent pink cellophane
a

Slaughter et al. (2007); bWellman and Liu (2004); c Matthews et al. (2003); d Lewis and Mitchell (1994); e Repacholi and Gopnik (1997); f Flavell et al. (1983).
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